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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the convergence process within the European Union
(27 countries). More particularly, we study the convergence process of the new
entrants from Central and Eastern Europe and of the 15 Western countries be-
tween 1990 and 2007. Applying a panel approach to the convergence equation
derived by Mankiw et al. (1992) from the Solow model, we highlight the existence
of heterogeneity in the European Union and show that new entrants and former
members of the European Union can be seen as belonging to signiﬁcantly diﬀer-
ent groups of convergence. The existence of heterogeneity in the European Union
or the Eurozone might aﬀect their stability as the recent Greece’s sovereign debt
crisis illustrates it.
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11 Introduction
The idea of integrating Central and Eastern Europe countries in the Euro-
pean Union dates back to the early 1990’s. On the ﬁrst of May 2004, ten
new countries1 joined the European Union. Among these ten countries, eight
belong to Central and Eastern Europe. Less than three years later, on the
ﬁrst of January 2007, two other countries from Eastern Europe, Bulgaria and
Romania, entered the European Union which is now composed of 27 coun-
tries. For the ﬁrst time in its history2, EU opened its doors to countries from
the former Eastern bloc.
Less than ﬁfteen years after the collapse of the Soviet bloc in 1990 and the
resulting shift from a planned economy to a market economy system, some
Central and Eastern Europe countries were allowed to join the European
Union which was until then exclusively composed of Western countries.
Obviously, candidates to the European Union membership have to meet some
political and economic requirements. In particular, applicants must possess
stable institutions that ensure the respect of democracy and human rights,
a viable market economy system and the capacity to cope with competitive
pressures.3 If these constraints have forced the new entrants from Central
and Eastern Europe to achieve some kind of structural and institutional con-
vergence toward Western standards, there still remains a long way to cover
before they can catch up their backwardness in terms of income per capita.
While the membership to European Union might be expected to speed up the
process of convergence to the Western Europe countries in terms of per capita
income levels, we can wonder if the income level convergence must be a con-
sequence of membership or a necessary prerequisite. Indeed, the European
Union does not impose any conditions on the process of income convergence
before joining the Eurozone. A central question is then to verify if new en-
trants already exhibit income convergence with the existing members of the
European Union or if we can identify the existence of two heterogeneous
groups in terms of convergence process within the European Union. Too
large heterogeneities within the European Union or the Eurozone might be
problematic as the recent troubles surrounding the Greece’s sovereign debt
have underlined it. As a consequence, testing the absence of heterogeneity,
among others, in terms of income convergence might be of prime importance
before a country is allowed to join the Eurozone.
1These ten countries are the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia plus Cyprus and Malta.
2If we except the somewhat particular case of East Germany.
3See Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (Treaty of Maastricht, 1992) and the
criteria set by the European council in Copenhagen (1993).
2In this context, this paper focuses on the process of convergence in terms of
per capita income levels in the European Union. We will make use of regres-
sion models which have been developed in the growth convergence literature
to check whether the countries in the European Union in 2010 are already
converging . More particularly, we examine the convergence process of two
distinct groups i.e. the 15 Western countries and the new entrants coming
from the former Eastern Bloc.
Our paper is structured as follows. We ﬁrst introduce the theoretical Solow
model, a short review of the literature on growth convergence, estimation
procedures and convergence within the European Union. The last sections
of our paper are dedicated to the description of our methodology, our empir-
ical results and to their analysis.
2 Literature Review
The debate on convergence between neoclassical and new growth theory pro-
ponents has led to a large number of deﬁnitions of the term convergence and
to a very well developed literature on the topic (for a thorough review of the
literature, see Islam (2003)). For our analysis, we consider the Neoclassical
Growth Solow model (1956).
The production function considers two factors of production, namely labour
L and capital K. This function has two important properties. First, it ex-
hibits constant returns to scale and, second, it assumes diminishing returns
to each factor. This second assumption is crucial for the model and especially
in the study of convergence. We include a technology variable A which is
labour-augmenting.
Y (t) = K(t)
α(A(t)L(t))
1−α
If we express the variables in intensive form (i.e. per eﬀective worker) the
production function is then y(t) = k(t)α and the evolution of the capital can
be written as:
˙ k(t) = sy(t) − (n + g + δ)k(t)
= sk(t)
α − (n + g + δ)k(t)
where s is the constant saving rate, n the growth rate of the population, g
the rate of technological progress and δ the rate capital depreciation. Note
that s, n, g and δ are exogenous and thus determined outside the model.
We can derive that k converges to the following steady state value:
k
∗ = [s (n + g + δ)]
1
1−α
3and then plugging k∗ into the production function, taking the logs and di-
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Thus, at the steady state, the income per capita depends positively on the
saving rate and negatively on the population growth rate.
Moreover if we consider that the share α of capital is around one third while
the share of labour is two third, then the elasticity of income with respect to
s is around 0.5 and the elasticity with respect to (n + g + δ) is around -0.5.
Rearranging, we end up with the following form:








ln(n + g + δ)
− (1 − e
−λt)ln(y(0))
where λ is the rate of convergence.
The growth rate depends positively on the saving rate and negatively on the
growth rate of the population and on the initial income (i.e. the lower the
initial income the higher the growth rate).
One important distinction is undoubtedly the diﬀerence between absolute (or
unconditional) and conditional convergence. The ﬁrst approach assumes that
countries are homogeneous so that they share the same steady state even if
they do not share the same income per capita at a certain moment. Conse-
quently, countries with lower initial level of GDP should experience higher
growth rates than initially richer countries. On the other hand, conditional
convergence makes no assumption about shared steady states so that other
parameters might explain diﬀerences in steady state levels of per capita in-
come. As a consequence, countries may converge to their own steady state
which is a function of some other variables. In this framework, a richer coun-
try could be characterized by a higher growth rate than a poorer country if
the former is farther from its steady state than the latter (this means in this
case that the steady state of the rich country would be much higher than
that of the poor country).
Baumol (1986) introduces in its pioneering paper a third kind of convergence
that is club convergence (see Galor (1996) for a more formal analysis of club
convergence). Club convergence implies that there may exist many per capita
income equilibria to which groups of countries converge. As opposed to the
unconditional convergence, this approach allows more than one unique equi-
librium while it does not suppose that each country has its own equilibrium
as in the conditional deﬁnition of convergence. The search for determinants
4of the belonging to one club or another has also led to an abundant literature
(see among others Durlauf and Johnson (1995), Desdoigts (1999)).
Early papers trying to empirically investigate the convergence of diﬀerent
countries mainly focus on what is called β-convergence. This measure of
convergence takes its name from the fact that it is based on the value (and as
importantly on the sign) of the beta estimates from a regression of the growth
rate of the per capita GDP on the initial level of per capita income . More
recently, another type of convergence has been put forward (see for instance
Quah (1993)) which is based on the evolution of dispersion of per capita in-
come across countries. This kind of convergence is called sigma-convergence.
Besides the many deﬁnitions that have been assigned to convergence, the
empirical literature has also given rise to diﬀerent econometric approaches
to the estimation of convergence. Seminal papers such as Baumol (1986)
or Mankiw et al. (1992) use cross-sections to estimate β-convergence using
two diﬀerent models. Mankiw et al. (1992) take the theoretical Solow model
as a starting point for testing convergence in terms of per capita income
levels. Consequently, they introduce in their regression the determinants of
the steady state under the Solow framework. Under the assumptions of the
Solow model, we can write the steady state of per capita income y∗ as:
y
∗ = A(0)e
gt[s (n + g + δ)]
α
1−α
where A(0) is the initial level of total factor productivity, g is the growth
rate of A, s is the saving rate, δ is the depreciation rate and α is the income
share of the capital in the Cobb-Douglas production function. Mankiw et al.
(1992) then derive the equation which allows them to test convergence from
the Solow model.
lny(t2) − lny(t1) = (1 − e
−λt)(lny
∗(t1) − lny(t1))
where y is the per capita income.
Substituting the value of y∗ from the steady state equation, they get the
growth-initial level equation:








ln(nt1 + g + δ)
− (1 − e
−λt)lny(t1)
The parameter λ which can be estimated from the value of the estimated β4
is interpreted as the speed of convergence5. In addition, from a theoretical
4We refer to the term β to denote the coeﬃcient related to the initial level of income.
This is in line with the deﬁnition of β-convergence.
5λ is easily calculated as: λ = −ln(1 + β) t
5point of view, we can notice that the coeﬃcients related to the saving rate
and to the combination of the population growth rate, the depreciation rate
and the growth of total factor productivity sum to zero.
In order to estimate their regression, Mankiw et al. (1992) allow the saving
rates and the population growth rates to diﬀer from one country to another.
However, they ﬁx the sum of the depreciation rate and of the growth rate of
total factor productivity to be equal to 0.05 for all countries.
A few years later, Islam (1995) develops a panel data approach to β-convergence
built on the same regression and data as Mankiw et al. (1992). As Islam
(1995) argues, the advantage of the panel approach is that it allows to ac-
count for the initial level of total factor productivity (A(0)) which should be
included in the individual eﬀect. To apply methods for panel data to the
dataset6, Islam divides the period into ﬁve subperiods of ﬁve years7 each.
In addition to cross-section and panel data methodologies, convergence study
has also recently been evaluated using time-series techniques (see among oth-
ers Evans and Karras (1996)).
Regarding the European Union, several papers have investigated income
growth convergence. Recently, Mora (2005), Fischer and Stirbock (2006) and
Battisti and Vaio (2008) have studied optimal regional convergence clubs in
the European Union. Their primary goal is to deﬁne clubs of regions within
the European Union sharing the same characteristics in terms of income
growth convergence without assuming any a priori restriction on the com-
position of these potential clubs. Another part of the literature has focused
on the convergence process of new entrants from Eastern Europe. Using a
cross-sectional approach, Matkowski and Prochniak (2007) ﬁnd a clear (ab-
solute) β-convergence within the group of new member countries while their
convergence process toward members seems slower. Kocenda et al. (2006)
and Ingianni and Zd´ arek (2009) also show evidence of β-convergence among
new entrants countries as well as toward former members although they high-
light signiﬁcant disparities among new member states with regard to their
convergence toward former members using a time-series approach. In this
context, the contribution of this paper is threefold. Firstly, we use the latest
update of the Penn World Tables which covers the period from 1990 to 2007.
Secondly, we apply the Islam (1995) panel data procedure which allows us to
account for potential individual eﬀects. Lastly and more importantly, we ex-
plicitly derive a test for the existence of heterogeneity in income convergence
speed between Western and Central and Eastern European countries.
6Islam (1995) uses the same database as Mankiw et al. (1992)
7He considers ﬁve year periods to be less inﬂuenced by business cycle and less likely to
be serially correlated than one year periods.
63 Data and Methodology
The data that we use to test convergence in terms of per capital income level
are taken from the latest version of the Heston, Summer and Aten’s Penn
World Tables.8 In particular, our regressions are based on the GDP per
capita in constant prices, the population and the investment share of Gross
Domestic Product for the 27 countries of the European Union from 1990 to
2007. Some of these variables need some more explanation. First, as any
income variable in the Penn World Tables, GDP per capita is expressed in
terms of purchasing power parity. On the other hand, we choose to work with
the investment rate rather than with saving rates. Indeed, if the theoretical
Solow model uses the saving rate, it also assumes a closed economy in which
case the saving rate coincides with the investment rate. Since we work with
open economies, the role of foreign investments on the evolution of the stock
of capital and hence the steady state is not negligible. That is why we prefer
to use investment rates rather than saving rates.9 In addition, we also follow
the hypothesis from Mankiw et al. (1992) on the values of the growth rate of
technology and the depreciation rate whose sum is assumed to be common
to all countries in the sample and to be equal to 0.05.
The aim of this paper is to test whether the new members of the European
Union from Central and Eastern Europe converge to the 15 Western Euro-
pean countries. In addition to testing convergence in the enlarged European
Union (27 countries), we also check whether the 10 members from Central
and Eastern Europe and the 15 Western European Union countries belong
to two diﬀerent groups in terms of convergence. We base our methodology
on the club convergence literature (Durlauf and Johnson (1995) and Fischer
and Stirbock (2006)) to test for two diﬀerent groups in the European Union.
More particularly, our tests are based on the comparison of convergence rates
for the diﬀerent groups of countries. However, as opposed to the traditional
literature on club convergence, we do not need to make use of any statistical
procedure to group countries. Since we want to speciﬁcally test the conver-
gence behaviour of the 10 countries of the Eastern bloc, the groups that we
consider are imposed by the goal of our paper itself.
8Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.3,
Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University
of Pennsylvania, August 2009.
9However, in order to remain consistent with the notation from the theoretical Solow
model, we use s for the investment rate.
74 Results
The main improvement of the panel approach with respect to the cross-
sectional method is that it allows for the presence of individual (country)
eﬀects. From this point of view, Islam (1995) notably mentions the unob-
servable initial level of technology, A(0). As a consequence, we ﬁrst divide
the full time period into six shorter time periods of three years in order to
obtain a panel. We proceed in three steps. First, we test income convergence
for the 27 countries in the European Union and then we apply the same
analysis to the two groups of 10 and 15 countries as previously described.
One of the concerns of Islam (1995) in the construction of the panel was that
shorter period might be inﬂuenced among others by business cycles. As a
result, the choice of the best length of subperiods involves a trade-oﬀ be-
tween not being too inﬂuenced by business cycles and having enough data
on the time dimension. To somewhat reduce the impact of business cycles on
our results, we introduce time dummies within our regression. Indeed, these
dummies are supposed to capture (at least the part which is common to all
the countries) the impact of economic cycles on growth data.
We only report the results from constrained regressions.10 This constraint is
actually rejected in none of the regressions and does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect
the coeﬃcient estimates .
The regression using all the European countries brings some interesting re-
sults. First of all, the coeﬃcient on the initial Gross Domestic Product is
signiﬁcantly negative which would be in favor of the hypothesis of conver-
gence in the European Union. However, as suggested by Bernard and Durlauf
(1996), it is not implausible to reject the null hypothesis of no convergence
within a group of countries although it is actually composed of several groups
with diﬀerent convergence processes.
Besides, individual eﬀects are positively correlated with the explanatory vari-
ables and the hypothesis of no signiﬁcant individual eﬀect is rejected by its
related F-test. This would speak in favor of the use of a panel rather than
a cross section approach and of the ﬁxed eﬀect methodology rather than the
random eﬀect approach.
Focusing on the 15 Western countries members of the European Union be-
fore 2004 and on the new entrants separately, we ﬁnd evidence of signiﬁcant
β-convergence within both groups.
The main question of our paper is to check whether there exists some het-
erogeneity in terms of convergence in the European Union between Western
10As described in the literature review, the equality (in absolute value) of the coeﬃcients
on the saving rate and the combination of population growth, technological growth and
depreciation rates is derived from the theoretical Solow model.
8Table 1: Regression Results by Group: 1990-2007
EU 27 Western Countries Eastern Countries
VARIABLES lny(t) − lny(t − 1) lny(t) − lny(t − 1) lny(t) − lny(t − 1)
lny(t − 1) -0.285*** -0.110** -0.380***
(0.062) (0.055) (0.114)
ln(s) − ln(nt1 + g + δ) 0.174*** 0.039 0.088*
(0.036) (0.063) (0.049)
D95 0.103*** 0.056*** 0.170***
(0.016) (0.012) (0.033)
D98 0.120*** 0.077*** 0.206***
(0.016) (0.013) (0.023)
D01 0.136*** 0.069*** 0.254***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.030)
D04 0.159*** 0.057*** 0.322***
(0.022) (0.019) (0.036)
D07 0.201*** 0.087*** 0.405***
(0.027) (0.022) (0.050)
Constant 2.446*** 1.050* 3.188***
(0.591) (0.545) (1.028)
R2 0.485 0.409 0.774
Number of countries 27 15 10
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
countries and new entrants from Central and Eastern Europe. This can be
done in a regression where we allow for diﬀerent initial income coeﬃcients
and diﬀerent time dummies for both groups. The diﬀerence between the two
betas coeﬃcients of interest for the two groups is captured in our last regres-
sion by the coeﬃcient on the product of the dummy for Eastern Countries
and the logarithm of the initial GDP (lny(t1)EAST). The results indicate the
coexistence of signiﬁcantly (at the 5% level) diﬀerent rates of convergence
within the European Union and particularly between Western and Eastern
countries. While we ﬁnd evidence of convergence within the European Union
(27 countries) for the period between 1990 and 2007, we also show that the
rates of convergence from the two groups of countries that we analyze are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent using the panel approach with time dummies. This
supports the existence of heterogeneous groups of countries within the Eu-
ropean Union in terms of convergence rates.
9Table 2: Global Regression: 1990-2007
VARIABLES lny(t) − lny(t − 1) Standard Errors
lny(t − 1) -0.110 0.076
lny(t − 1)EAST -0.270** 0.114
ln(s) − ln(nt1 + g + δ) 0.039 0.087
ln(s)EAST − ln(nt1 + g + δ)EAST 0.049 0.094
D95 EAST 0.170*** 0.024
D98 EAST 0.206*** 0.022
D01 EAST 0.254*** 0.022
D04 EAST 0.322*** 0.027
D07 EAST 0.405*** 0.037
D95 WEST 0.056*** 0.017
D98 WEST 0.077*** 0.018
D01 WEST 0.069*** 0.023
D04 WEST 0.057** 0.026
D07 WEST 0.087*** 0.030
Constant 1.888*** 0.549
R2 0.717
Number of countries 25
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
5 Robustness Check: 1996-2007
As a robustness check of our results, we repeat the same methodology to the
period from 1996 to 2007 using a panel of 4 periods of 3 years. Indeed, the ﬁrst
years of our original panel coincide with the period directly following the shift
from a planned to a market economy for the countries from the former Soviet
bloc. This transformation obviously required institution changes which might
have impacted the process of economic growth in these countries. As a result,
by eliminating these early years of our panel, we explicitly try to obtain
results free from any bias arising from the transition process.
While the convergence rates in the European Union and within both
groups are slightly diﬀerent from those obtained using the entire panel, the
conclusions in terms of heterogeneity of income convergence within the Eu-
ropean Union remain unchanged. In addition, the R2 of the regression for
10Table 3: Regression Results by Group: 1996-2007
EU 27 Western Countries Eastern Countries
VARIABLES lny(t) − lny(t − 1) lny(t) − lny(t − 1) lny(t) − lny(t − 1)
lny(t − 1) -0.170*** -0.198*** -0.416***
(0.054) (0.047) (0.090)
ln(s) − ln(nt1 + g + δ) 0.136*** 0.138*** 0.109***
(0.031) (0.046) (0.039)
D01 0.006 -0.003 0.049***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.016)
D04 0.018 -0.005 0.121***
(0.013) (0.010) (0.025)
D07 0.050*** 0.025* 0.208***
(0.017) (0.013) (0.038)
Constant 1.503*** 1.849*** 3.688***
(0.502) (0.468) (0.800)
R2 0.293 0.626 0.641
Number of countries 27 15 10
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
the 27 countries is lower those of the regression by groups which may also
be seen as evidence for the coexistence of two signiﬁcantly diﬀerent groups
of convergence within the European Union.
6 Conclusions
This paper aims at testing whether the new European Union members from
Eastern Europe were already exhibiting a convergence process toward mem-
bers. In particular, we test for the existence of two heterogeneous groups
of countries with diﬀerent convergence rates. The presence of heterogene-
ity within the European Union could have implications on the eﬃciency of
functioning of the European Union and the Eurozone as the recent Greece’s
sovereign debt crisis has highlighted. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant rate of conver-
gence for the 27 countries composing European Union. More importantly,
our global regression based on the Islam’s framework including dummies for
time shows that Western European countries and newcomers from Eastern
and Central Europe display signiﬁcantly diﬀerent rates of convergence hence
supporting the idea of heterogeneity in the European Union. These results
are robust to changes in the period of analysis. However, whether the joining
11Table 4: Global Regression: 1996-2007
VARIABLES lny(t) − lny(t − 1) Standard Errors
lny(t − 1) -0.198*** 0.068
lny(t − 1)EAST -0.218** 0.095
ln(s) − ln(nt1 + g + δ) 0.138** 0.067
ln(s)EAST − ln(nt1 + g + δ)EAST -0.028 0.073
D01 EAST 0.049*** 0.012
D04 EAST 0.121*** 0.018
D07 EAST 0.208*** 0.028
D01 WEST -0.003 0.012
D04 WEST -0.005 0.015
D07 WEST 0.025 0.019
Constant 2.585*** 0.469
R2 0.637
Number of countries 25
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
of these Eastern Countries will reduce this heterogeneity is still a question to
be answered in future research. In addition, it might be of prime importance
to verify the disappearance of this signiﬁcant heterogeneity before all the
newcomers are allowed to join the Eurozone.
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